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Abstract 
 
 
We derive a golden rule for the level of health care expenditures and find that the optimal 
level of life-extending health care expenditures should increase with rising productivity and 
retirement age, while the effects of improvement in medical technology are ambiguous.  
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1. Introduction 
Advanced economies devote significant resources to health care. A substantial part of the 
spending is for treatments that will extend the lives of the elderly.
1
 In this paper, we address 
the question how much a nation should sacrifice in terms of the consumption of individuals in 
order to extend the life of generations. Clearly, a society could sacrifice the consumption of its 
population in order to devote large resources to treat the old. Alternatively, a nation could 
choose to live happily, not worrying about the length of the lifespan, as long as they can.  
 
2. Literature 
A large body of literature exists on the determinants of health care expenditures. What 
separates this literature from our approach is that, while the literature mainly approaches the 
issue as demand for health care by individuals as a function of income and age, we solve the 
social planner’s problem. Our approach is not to describe how individuals form their demand 
for health care but to derive how much society should spend on extending the lives of its 
citizens.   
 
The question concerning the optimal level of health care spending is closely related to the 
golden rule literature that began with Ramsey (1928) on the optimal level of saving and was 
expanded in papers on the optimal level of research and the optimal level of education (see 
Phelps, 1966 and 1968, among others). Here, investing in future research ideas, education, or 
the physical capital stock requires a reduction in current levels of consumption, while better 
education and technology and a larger stock of capital will make possible an increase in the 
future level of consumption.  
 
Becker (1964) introduced the concept of human capital. In his framework, individuals have 
different levels of human capital – which determines their future earning potential – and can 
add to this stock through education and training. Grossman (1972) expanded Becker’s notion 
of human capital to include health capital and made a distinction between health as an output 
and medical care as one of many inputs in the production function for good health. Here 
health is a durable capital stock that gradually depreciates with age but can be augmented 
through health care and healthy living. Health as capital yields an output of “healthy time” 
which affects productivity in the workplace, therefore affecting wages, productivity at home, 
                                                          
1
 According to the World Bank the United States spent on average from 2001-1010 around 16% of GDP on 
health care (sum of public and private costs).  
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and utility from leisure. We depart from Grossman in not modeling the investment in good 
health by individuals but instead modeling the social planner’s problem of optimal investment 
in lower mortality rates among those who have retired from the labor market. The social 
planner must trade off lower private consumption against a longer lifespan due to better 
medical care in old age.  
 
The empirical literature on the determinants of health care spending has focused mainly on 
exploring the income elasticity of the demand for health care. One issue is whether there is a 
positive relationship between income and the level of health care expenditures. A related 
question is whether health care is a luxury good; i.e., having elasticity greater than one with 
respect to income. A part of this literature has used cross-sections of countries having health 
expenditures per capita as a dependent variable and GDP per capita, the age structure of the 
population, and sometimes measures of medical technology as explanatory variables; other 
studies use pooled data for a sample of countries over time; and yet others analyze the time-
series properties of the two series for individual countries or groups of countries. 
 
One of the most frequently cited papers in this literature is Newhouse (1977). He studied the 
relationship between GDP per capita and per capita medical care expenditures for 13 
developed countries and found that more than 90% of the variation in the level of health care 
expenditures across countries could be explained by differences in the level of GDP per 
capita. Several other studies found similar results using data for different samples of countries 
and different time periods.
2
 Gerdtham et al. (1992) extended this analysis to pooled data of 20 
OECD countries over the period 1960-1987 and also found a positive income elasticity of 
health care spending with respect to GDP. The same applies to Parkin et al. (1987), who use 
PPP-adjusted numbers for health care spending and GDP per capita in a cross-section of 
countries. Hitiris and Posnett (1992) also found a positive effect of income on health care.  
 
Hansen and King (1996) criticized previous studies by pointing out the possibility of non-
stationarity of the time series. These authors found non-stationarity in the health care 
spending and the income series for many countries but failed to detect cointegration between 
the variables. Blomqvist and Carter (1997) studied individual country series and found both 
unit roots in the series and a long-run relationship between them. Gerdtham and Lothgren 
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 See Cullis and West (1979), Maxwell (1981) and Leu (1986), among others. 
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(2000) found both non-stationarity and cointegration in a panel of countries, allowing for 
linear trends.  
 
Di Matteo (2005) used state-level data for the United States for the period 1980-1998 and 
province-level data for Canada for 1975-2000. He found that health care expenditures 
depended on income, time, and age distribution. While it is not surprising that the ageing of 
the population increases health expenditures, it does come as a surprise that it is not only 
those over 65 who tend to increase expenditures but also the proportion aged 18-44.  Baltagi 
and Moscone (2010) also find an effect of the younger population on health care expenditures. 
They investigate the long-run relationship between health care expenditures and income in 20 
OECD countries and find, in addition to a positive long-run relationship between health care 
expenditures and income, that the proportion of young people has a positive effect on health 
care spending.  
 
In this paper, we are concerned about the cost of extending lives rather than improving the 
quality of life. The cost of extending lives has been shown to be a significant component of 
overall health care expenditures. Seshamani and Gray (2004) use English longitudinal data  
and find that approaching death affects costs for up to 15 years prior to the time of death. In 
particular, the tenfold increase in costs from five years prior to death to the last year of life is 
much greater than the 30% increase from age 65 to 85. Lubitz and Riley (2003) study 
Medicare payments in the US and find that around 30% of Medicare payments go to people in 
the last year of life. These authors find that people in their last year of life make up 35% to 
39%t of the 5% of beneficiaries with the highest costs.  Note that this is clearly an 
underestimate of the cost of extending lives, as the figure omits the cost of treatment of those 
who lives were extended beyond one year. Jones (2003) and Miller (2001) also find that US 
Medicare expenditures rise rapidly in the years preceding death. The former finds that 
expenditures rise at the rate of 9.4% per year in the 3-10 years before death and then by 45% 
in the final two years before death.  
 
Jones (2003) argues that the critical determinant of health expenditures as a share of GDP is 
the willingness of society to transfer resources to those at the end of life. Better medical 
technology that makes it possible to extend lives makes health care expenditures and life 
expectancy increase over time. This leads us to the topic of this paper, which is to answer the 
question how much the working population should pay to extend the lives of the older 
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generation when realizing that they will also receive the same care funded by the next 
generation. 
 
3. The golden rule of longevity derived 
The model is a continuous-time and continuous-age overlapping-generation model where 
individuals belonging to different generations (at different ages) are alive at each point in 
time. An individual receives utility from consumption, works during the first part of his life 
cycle, and retires at a certain age. Furthermore, it is assumed that the economy is a small, 
open one, so that the interest rate r is constant for the economy and the current account is 
balanced at all times. 
 
3.1 Demographics 
The population at time t is split into two groups: those working (young), whose ages are 
between 0 and R (  [   ]), and those retired (old), whose ages are between R and A 
(  (   ]), where R is the retirement age and A is the maximum age or longevity. Because 
the main concerns of this paper are the effects of health care expenditure for the elderly, it is 
assumed that survival probabilities are constant and equal to one when an individual is young, 
and decreasing and concave in age when he is old. Hence the survival probabilities are: 
 (   )  
 
 (   )
    
  [   ]
  (   ]
  (1) 
where         (   )    and  (   )   , which implies that    (   )    must hold.  
Further, it is assumed that  (   ) is strictly decreasing and strictly concave in a and strictly 
increasing concave in A: 
  
  
   
   
   
   
  
  
   
The following figure shows the survival function. 
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Following Boucekkine et al. (2002), the number of individuals born is assumed to grow at a 
constant rate n and the number of individuals born at time t is     , where    . The 
number of individuals aged a at time t is therefore: 
 (       )     (   ) (   )          (2) 
Note that  (       )        ,  (       )    and 
  
  
  . Hence the number of 
individuals born at time t is     , the number of individuals exceeding the maximum age A is 
zero, and the number of individuals aged a is strictly decreasing in a for all t and A. In 
addition, 
  
  
   for all   (   ], implying that the number of old individuals at each age 
level is increasing in longevity. Using (2), the population mass in the economy at time t can 
be written: 
 (     )  ∫  (       )   ∫  (       )  
 
   
 
   
                             (3) 
and the number of young and old individuals, respectively: 
  (       )  ∫  (     )  
 
   
                                                       (4) 
  (       )  ∫  (     )  
 
   
                                                 (5) 
It follows from (2) and (3) that the population growth rate in the economy follows the growth 
rate of individuals born:  ̇  ⁄   , where ̇  is the time derivative. 
 
Furthermore, the number of the young and the old individuals is strictly increasing in the 
population growth rate: 
   
  
 ∫  (   )  (   ) (   )  
 
   
 ∫ (   ) (       )  
 
   
   
 m(a,A) 
R A 
1 
6 
 
   
  
 ∫  (   )  (   ) (   )  
 
   
 ∫ (   ) (       )  
 
   
    
 
3.2  Individual utility 
Individuals gain utility from consumption: 
 ( (   ))       [   ] (6) 
where c(t,a) is consumption for an individual aged a at time t. Utility from consumption is 
standard (strictly increasing and concave). Note that although longevity is uncertain for a 
given individual, the fraction of individuals reaching a certain age is deterministic for the 
social planner (see below).  
 
3.3 Health care expenditure and longevity 
Health care expenditure per old individual at time t  ( ) is assumed to affect longevity and 
thus the health of old individuals (since  (   ) is assumed to be strictly increasing in A) in 
the following way: 
    ( )                                                             (7) 
where     is a parameter measuring efficiency in health care production.  
 
3.4 Output 
Each young individual produces  ( )    at time t. National output in the economy at time t 
can therefore be written as:  
  (       ) ( )                                                   (8) 
  
3.5 The social planner’s problem 
We assume a balanced current account growth path and hence balanced budget constraints for 
the economy at all points in time. The economy-wide budget constraint is therefore in balance 
at all points in time: 
∫  (       ) ( )  
 
   
  
 ∫  (       ) (   )   ∫  (       ) (   )   
 
   
 
   
∫  (       ) ( )  
 
   
      
(9) 
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Because a balanced budget for the economy is assumed, there is no transfer of resources 
across time. The social planner’s welfare objective can therefore be written as: 
  ∫  (       ) ( (   ))   
 
   
∫  (       ) ( (   ))  
 
   
                     (10) 
The maximization of this objective function subject to the budget constraint in (9) gives the 
social optimum. Note that the welfare function in (10) is strictly increasing in 
 (   )           [   ] and  ( ) (through A). The budget constraint in (9) ensures that a 
maximum exists to the constrained maximization problem (increased spending on health care 
per old individual decreases consumption given output and hence raises the marginal utility of 
consumption, ensuring that a maximum exists).
3
  
 
The Lagrangian for the maximization problem is (after using (1), (2, (6), (7) and (8)): 
 ( )  ∫    (   ) ( (   ))  
 
   
 ∫    (   ) (    ( )) ( (   ))  
  ( )
   
 
  ( ) * ∫    (   ) ( )   
 
   
∫    (   ) (   )  
 
   
 ∫    (   ) (    ( )) (   )  
  ( )
   
 ∫    (   ) (    ( )) ( )  
  ( )
   
+ 
The first-order conditions are (after some manipulation): 
  
  (   )
  ( ) for   [   ] 
 
* ∫    (   ) ( (   ))
  
  
  
 
   
+   
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 In Appendix A1, it is shown that the first-order conditions derived below in fact give a maximum for the 
welfare function in (10), subject to the budget constraint in (9). 
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  ( ) * ∫    (   ) (   )
  
  
   
 
   
∫    (   ) ( )
  
  
  
 
   
+  
  ( ) ∫    (   ) (   )  
 
   
   
∫    (   ) (  )   
 
   
∫    (   ) (   )   ∫    (   ) (   ) (   )  
 
   
 
   
 ∫    (   ) (   ) ( )  
 
   
   
where it has been used that  (   )   . The first condition implies that the marginal utility 
of consumption is independent of age (because  ( ) is independent of age). Hence we have 
consumption smoothing across generations at each time t: 
 (   )   ( ) for   [   ]  (11) 
Using (11) in the second first order condition gives (and after some manipulation using (1), 
(2) and (5)): 
 ( ( ))
   
  
   
  
  ( )
( ( )   ( ))
   
  
  
  
  ( )
  (       )                    (12) 
This equation gives optimal spending on health care per old individual. The left-hand side 
shows increased social welfare in terms of a greater number of old individuals reaching each 
age level and therefore more individuals receiving utility from consumption. The first term on 
the right-hand side shows the lost utility for all others, whose consumption is reduced due to 
the consumption and medical needs of those who reach higher age levels because of the 
increased provision of health care. The second term denotes the utility effect of their lower 
consumption that is due to higher health care expenditures.   
 
Finally, the budget constraint must hold, which can be written in the following way after 
using the result in (11) (and after some manipulation using (1), (2), (4) and (5)): 
( ( )   ( ))  (       )  ( ( )   ( ))  (       )                          (13) 
 The output net of consumption of the working-age population must equal the sum of 
consumption and the health care expenditures of the old generations. 
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4 Implications 
The conditions in (12) and (13) give the optimal levels of consumption per capita  ( ) and 
health care expenditure per old individual  ( ) as implicit functions of time t, population 
growth n, productivity y(t), the retirement age R, the parameters   and    and the functional 
form of the utility function  . Below we analyze how productivity, both in the private sector 
y(t) and in the public sector γ, and the retirement age R affect the optimal level of health care 
expenditure per old individual  ( ). 
 
The effect of increased productivity y(t) is given by: 
  ( )
  ( )
 
   
  ( ) 
(   ( ( )  ( ))
   
  
 )  
 
                                         (14) 
where 
  (     )
  
  ( )
  (
 
   
  
    
   
  
 
  
   
  
)   
   
  ( ) 
(   ( ( )   ( ))
   
  
 )
 
. 
Note that Ψ is negative, as is shown in Appendix A1, the nominator is negative due to 
diminishing marginal utility, and 
   
  
  , as can be seen from (1), (2) and (5), which gives 
the sign in (14). 
 
Intuitively, the marginal utility of consumption of each member of the working-age 
population declines as the level of productivity rises. Lower marginal utility reduces the 
burden of paying taxes to support the currently old and to pay for their health care, which 
increases the golden rule level of health care provision. It follows that people should live 
longer in more developed countries.  
 
An increase in the retirement age R implies an increase in the ratio of working-age population 
to those retired. The effects of a higher retirement age R are: 
  ( )
  
 
[
(     )
  
  ( )
   
  
 
   
  ( ) 
(   ( ( )  ( ))
   
  
 )( ( )  ( ))  (
 
  
   
  
 
 
  
   
  
)
]
 
                              (15) 
The sign of the first term in the nominator is negative because 
   
  
  , as can be seen from 
(5), and it has been used that  (   )    a constant. The sign of the second term depends on 
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the sign of 
 
  
   
  
 
 
  
   
  
, which is positive because 
   
  
   and 
   
  
  , as can be seen 
from (4) and (5). Hence the second term is negative and the nominator is negative. Combining 
this with a negative denominator gives the sign in (15). 
 
Intuitively, a higher retirement age increases the number of working-age individuals, output, 
and consumption, which results in increased spending on health care due to diminishing 
marginal utility from consumption. This result is consistent with Di Matteo (2005) and 
Baltagi and Moscone (2010), who found a positive relationship between health care 
expenditures and the share of working-age individuals in the total population.
4
 
 
The effect of increased efficiency in health care provision γ is given by:   
  ( )
  
 
 
[
 
 
 
 (     )
  
  ( )
  (
 
 
 
 
   
  
    
   
 
 
  
   
  
) 
 
   
  ( ) 
(   ( ( )  ( ))
   
  
 )( ( )  ( ))
   
  
 ]
 
 
 
 
 
                              (16) 
The second term in the nominator is negative, while the sign of the first term is uncertain. 
Hence the sign of the derivative is uncertain. According to Jones (2003), this derivative 
should be positive and should explain a substantial part of the increased expenditures on 
health care in developed countries. 
 
Intuitively, increased efficiency in health care provision results in a reduction in the health 
care expenditures per capita needed to maintain unchanged longevity and health, which 
implies a negative sign for the derivative in (16), while the marginal benefit from spending on 
health care increases, which implies a positive sign for the derivative It is not clear which 
effect is stronger. 
 
5 Conclusions 
We have derived a golden rule for the amount that a nation should sacrifice in terms of the 
consumption of individuals in order to extend the life of generations. The results show that 
more productive societies should spend more, per capita, on health care because the utility 
                                                          
4
 An increase in the rate of population growth n will also increase the ratio of the number of working-age 
individuals to retirees as long as the age of retirement R is closer to A than to the date of birth – that is, in the 
second half of an individual’s life (see Appendix A2). This can be shown to increase the optimal level of health 
care provision  ( ) given plausible assumptions.  
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loss of individuals is smaller due to a lower marginal utility of consumption. Furthermore, 
societies with a higher retirement age should spend more on health care because of their 
higher output and consumption levels. However, increased efficiency in health care provision 
has an ambiguous effect. Empirical studies have confirmed a positive relationship between 
health care expenditures per capita and GDP per capita, on the one hand, and the share of 
working-age individuals in total population, on the other, both of which are consistent with 
our golden rule.  
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Appendix 
 
A1. Second-order conditions 
Given consumption smoothing in (11), the first-order derivatives of the Lagrangian can be 
written as (using (1), (2), (4) and (5)): 
  ( )
  ( )
 (
  
  ( )
  ) (     )                     
  ( )
  ( )
  ( ( ))
   
  
   ( ( )   ( ))
   
  
                          
  ( )
  
  ( )    ( )(     )   ( )       
And the second-order derivatives are (after evaluating those at maximum and rewriting): 
 
   ( )
  ( ) 
 
   
  ( ) 
(     )                     
   ( )
  ( ) 
 
  
  ( )
  (
 
   
  
    
   
  
 
  
   
  
)                      
   ( )
   
             
 
   ( )
  ( )  ( )
   
   ( )
  ( )  
 (     )                     
   ( )
  ( )  
 (   ( ( )   ( ))
   
  
 )     
Hence, for the bordered Hessian to be positive definite and the first-order conditions being 
necessary and sufficient for a maximum, the following must hold: 
 (     ) *(     )
  
  ( )
  (
 
   
  
    
   
  
 
  
   
  
) 
 
   
  ( ) 
(   ( ( )   ( ))
   
  
 )
 
+    
or: 
(     )
  
  ( )
  (
 
   
  
    
   
  
 
  
   
  
)  
 
   
  ( ) 
(   ( ( )   ( ))
   
  
 )
 
   
or: 
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(
   
  
)
 
 ( 
   
  ( ) 
)
(   ( ( )   ( ))
   
   )
    
  
(     )
  
  ( )
   
 
The right-hand side is positive because 
   
  
  , 
  
  ( )
   and  
   
  ( ) 
  . This implies that, 
for the first-order conditions being necessary and sufficient for a maximum, there must be an 
upper bound on 
    
   
, or an upper bound on how longevity affects the effects of longevity on 
the number of old individuals 
 
   
  
  
. Using (1), (2), and (5) gives: 
    
   
    (   )
  
     
 ∫    (   )
   
   
  
 
   
 
   
   
   must hold in order to ensure that    (   )   , as is assumed, and the last term on 
the right-hand side is therefore negative. The first term on the right-hand side is positive, 
however, because 
  
  
   for all   (   ] and all A. Plugging this into the inequality above 
gives: 
  
     
 
 
   (   )
 
  
(
   
  
)
 
 
 
   (   )
( 
   
  ( ) 
)
(   ( ( )   ( ))
   
   )
    
  
(     )
  
  ( )
   
 ∫   (   ) ( 
   
   
)  
 
   
 
where all of the terms on the right-hand side are positive. Hence, for the first-order conditions 
being necessary and sufficient for a maximum, there must be an upper bound to the effects of 
increased longevity on survival probabilities evaluated at the maximum age A. We only 
assume that this is positive 
  
  
   and decreasing in longevity 
   
   
  . Hence we have made 
no assumption about the size of 
  
  
. Note, however, that assumptions can easily be made such 
that this inequality holds and the necessary conditions being necessary and sufficient for a 
maximum.  
 
 
A2. Effects from an increase in n on the ratio between working-age population and 
        those retired 
 
Using the results above gives: 
   
  
 
   
  
 ∫(   ) (       )   ∫(   ) (       )  
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Since 
  
  
   and    , it holds that: 
 [(   ) (       )]
  
   (       )  (   )
  
  
   
This implies that: 
∫(   ) (       )  
 
   
 (   ) (       )  
∫(   ) (       )  
 
   
 (   ) (       )(   ) 
Hence a sufficient condition for 
   
  
 
   
  
   to hold is that: 
(   ) (       )  (   ) (       )(   ) 
or: 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Q.E.D. 
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